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Interjurisdictional tax competition is a controversial theme with few empirical studies in spite of the great advance in
the theoretical debate of the last decades. In order to link the theoretical issues with empirical tools and results, this
paper uses an interregional general equilibrium model to evaluate the welfare effects of an experimental game of tax
competition between two regional governments of the Brazilian economy. The results suggest that interjurisdictional tax
competition is a race-to-the-bottom but this outcome is welfare-improving at the Nash equilibrium. Also is observed
that the vertical linkages of the Brazilian fiscal federalism play an important role on the welfare effects of
interjurisdictional tax competition.
Key-words: tax competition, fiscal federalism and interregional CGE model.
Resumo
A discussão sobre competição tributária interjurisdicional é bastante polêmica e há uma lacuna de estudos empíricos
sobre seus efeitos, embora tenha ocorrido significativo avanço no debate teórico nas últimas décadas. No sentido de
contribuir para integrar a discussão teórica com instrumentos de análise empírica, o presente trabalho utiliza um modelo
inter-regional de equilíbrio geral computável para avaliar os efeitos de bem-estar decorrentes de um jogo experimental
de competição tributária entre dois governos regionais da economia brasileira. A simulação mostrou que a competição
tributária gera um equilíbrio de Nash do tipo race-to-the-bottom, mas este equilíbrio é welfare-improving. Também foi
constatado que as relações verticais subjacentes ao federalismo fiscal brasileiro têm um papel importante na explicação
dos efeitos de bem-estar da competição tributária interjurisdicional.
Palavras-chave: competição tributária, federalismo fiscal e modelo CGE inter-regional.
JEL: H39, H73, R13.
Área 4 – Economia do Setor Público
1. Introduction
The theoretical issues on the effects of interjurisdictional tax competition have grown since the
seminal work of Tiebout (1956) and there are controversial positions about its welfare effects. On
the one hand, theories based on the view of governments exclusively as benevolent agents shown
that tax competition is inefficient and produces a suboptimal Nash equilibrium (Mintz and Tulkens,
1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wildasin, 1988; Burbdige and Myers, 1994; Cadarelli,
Taugourdeau and Vidal, 2002). On the other hand, theories based on the view of governments as a
Leviathan agent suggest that tax competition can produce an efficient equilibrium and it works like
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an effective mechanism to refrain the governments’ predatory action on the society (Rauscher,
1998; Cassette, Jayet and Paty, 2005).
In spite of the great advance in the theoretical studies, few empirical analyses have been carried out
in order to evaluate the welfare effects of interjurisdictional tax competition. An exception is the
work of Mendoza and Tesar (2003), where the welfare effects of capital tax competition are
analyzed through a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model building based on the
neoclassical-growth model. The simulation results conducted by the authors showed that capital tax
competition is race-to-the-bottom when consumption tax rates are adjusted to guarantee budget
balance but this outcome is welfare improving, contrary to benevolent-base theories.
In fact, the effects of the interjurisdictional tax competition in the real word depend of empirical
characteristics associated with the economic system in focus such as the level of regional
interdependence between the economies given by the comercial flows of goods and the fiscal
linkages between different levels of governments if the competition game takes place into a federal
system. This paper proposes to evaluate the welfare effects of the interjurisdictional tax competition
using a CGE model calibrated for an economic system where regional governments compete for
investments. We assumes that the federal (central) government does not act strategically, but the
effects of regional tax competition on the federal tax base has a important role because of the hard
vertical linkages imposed by constitutional rules. Taking into account the vertical linkages between
the governments is particularly important for the Brazilian federal system because the 1988
Constitution deepened the fiscal transfers from federal government to regional governments. The
federal transfers to the regions rose from 10% to 21.5% of the income and indirect tax revenue
collected by the federal government.
The paper builds on the B-MARIA-RS, an interregional CGE model calibrated for two regions of
the Brazilian economy, Rio Grande do Sul and Rest of Brazil. CGE models are interesting and
promising tools to evaluate interjurisdictional tax competition as it incorporates important general
equilibrium effects in the analysis and, contrary to econometric studies, it can focus on actual
welfare estimates instead of focusing on revenues or fiscal budgets only. The simulation is
implemented assuming the regional governments engage in a non cooperative game where the
indirect tax rate on manufacturing goods are strategies used to influence allocations of the
productive factors (capital and labor). The vertical linkages of the Brazilian federal system are fully
modeled in the B-MARIA-RS model.
The Rio Grande do Sul state is the fourth state economy in the country as well as one of the top
human development indices in the country, with a diversified manufacturing structure and
significant openness to the regional and international markets. The Brazilian case is an interesting
one as its sophisticated fiscal federalism institutions (Shah, 1991) that nevertheless shares common
problems with other systems in Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Colombia (Tomasi
et al., 2001).
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. First, after this introduction, the B-
MARIA-RS model is presented focusing on its theoretical economic structure and describing the
organization of the public finance account by government level and its linkages. The section three
presents the modeling strategy adopted to implement the simulation of non cooperative game
between the regional governments and the main results are discussed in the following section. The
final remarks follow in the last section in an attempt to evaluate our findings and put then in
perspective, considering their extension and limitations.
2. The B-MARIA-RS model
B-MARIA-RS (Brazilian Multisectoral and Regional/Interregional Analysis – Rio Grande do Sul)
is an interregional computable general equilibrium model developed for the analysis of the3
economy of Rio Grande do Sul and of Brazil. Its theoretical framework is similar to the B-MARIA
model (Haddad, 1999) and follows the Australian tradition of general equilibrium models.
1
The B-MARIA-RS model divides the Brazilian economy into two regions, Rio Grande do Sul and
Rest of Brazil, and identifies a single foreign market (Rest of the World). The calibration data are
those for 1998, and 25 productive sectors and investment goods are specified for each region. The
productive sectors use two local primary factors (capital and labor). The final demand consists of
household consumption, investment, exports, and regional and federal government consumption.
The regional governments are sources of exclusively local demands and expenditure, comprising
the state and municipal levels of public administration in each region. The whole model contains
60,323 equations and 1,475 exogenous variables.
2
The main innovation in the B-MARIA-RS model is the detailed treatment of public finances that
recognizes the horizontal and vertical linkages between the Brazilian governments. As will be
described below, this modification allows introducing alternative closures for the governments
regarding public finance policies. The core module of the model consists of equation blocks that
determine the relationship between supply and demand, derived from optimization theories, and
market equilibrium conditions. The indirect taxes at the core of the model are decomposed in order
to separate the state indirect tax from the other federal and municipal indirect taxes. In addition,
several regional and national aggregates are defined, such as level of aggregate employment,
balance of trade and price indices. Next, we present the main theoretical aspects of the model. Other
definitions in the model include tax rates, basic prices, and purchase prices of commodities, tax
revenues, margins, components of the gross domestic product (GDP) and gross regional product
(GRP), regional and national price indices, factor prices, aggregate employment and money wage
settings. The functional forms of the main groups of equations of the interregional CGE core are
presented in the Appendix together with the definition of the main groups of variables, parameters
and coefficients.
Production technology
Figure 1 illustrates the production technology encountered in the B-MARIA-RS model, a usual
specification in regional models. This specification defines three levels of optimization for the
productive process of firms. The dashed lines indicate the functional forms specified in each stage.
Fixed proportion combinations of intermediate inputs and primary factors are assumed at the first
level, through the Leontief specification. The second level involves substitution between
domestically produced and imported inputs on one side, and substitution between capital and labor
on the other side. A constant elasticity substitution (CES) function is used for the combination of
inputs and primary factors. At the third level, bundles of domestically produced and imported
intermediate inputs are formed as combinations of inputs from different sources. Again, a CES
function is used to combine goods from different sources.
The use of CES functions in the production technology implies the adoption of the so-called
Armington assumption (Armington, 1969) for product differentiation. This hypothesis regards
goods from different sources as imperfect substitutes. For instance, agricultural and livestock
products from Rio Grande do Sul are different from the agricultural and livestock products from the
Rest of Brazil with regard to their use in the productive process (third level in Figure 1). This
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treatment permits the model to exhibit non-specialized intrasectoral market patterns, an important
empirical regularity described in the literature.
3



















Each region has a group of representative households, which buy domestic goods (either locally
produced or from other regions) and imported goods. The specification of household demand, in
each region, is based on a CES/linear expenditure system (LES) preference function. The demand
equations are derived from a utility maximization problem, whose solution follows hierarchical
steps, similar to the ones shown in Figure 1. At the bottom level, substitution occurs across different
domestic and imported sources of supply. At the subsequent upper level, substitution occurs
between domestic composite and imported goods. The utility derived from the consumption of
domestic and imported composite goods is maximized according to a Stone-Geary utility function.
This specification gives rise to the linear expenditure system (LES), in which the expenditure share
above the subsistence level for each good represents a constant proportion of the total subsistence
expenditure of each regional household.
4
Demand for Investment Goods
Investors are a category of use of final demand, and are held responsible for capital formation in
each regional sector. They choose the inputs used in the capital formation process through cost
minimization using a hierarchically structured technology. This technology is similar to the
production technology, with some adaptations. As in the production technology, the capital good is
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produced by domestic and imported inputs. At the third level, an aggregate bundle of intermediate
goods (domestic and imported) is formed as the combination of inputs from different sources. A
CES function is used in the combination of goods from different sources. Differently from the
production technology, primary factors are not used directly as input for capital formation, but used
indirectly through inputs in sectoral production, especially in the construction sector. The level of
regional investment in capital goods per sector is determined by the capital accumulation block.
Exports and Government Demand
All exported goods have downward sloping demand curves for their own prices in the world
market. A vector of elasticity defines the response of foreign demand to changes in the FOB price
of regional exports.
The government demand for public goods is based on the isolation of the consumption of public
goods by the regional and federal governments, obtained from the input-output matrix. However,
productive activities carried out by the public sector cannot be dissociated from those performed by
the private sector. Thus, the government’s entrepreneurial behavior is dictated by the same cost
minimization assumptions adopted by the private sector. This hypothesis may be considered more
appropriate, at first, for the Brazilian economy, since the privatization process implemented in the
1990s substantially reduced the participation of the government in the productive sector (Haddad,
1999). Public goods consumption is set to maintain a constant proportion with 1) regional private
consumption, in the case of regional governments, and 2) with national private consumption, in the
case of the federal government.
Capital Accumulation and Investment
Capital stock and investment relationships are defined in this module. There are two comparative
static versions for the model that allow its use in short-run and long-run simulations. The use of the
comparative statics model implies no fixed relationship between capital and investment; this
relationship is selected on the basis of the requirements of the specific simulation. For example, in
typical long-run comparative static simulations, growth of investment and capital is assumed to be
identical (see Peter et al., 1996). Some qualifications are necessary for the specification of capital
formation and investment in the model. As discussed in Dixon et al. (1982), the modeling of these
components is basically concerned with how investment expenditures are allocated both per sector
and per region, and not with the aggregate private investment in construction, machinery and
equipment. On top of that, the temporal conception of investment used is not associated with a
precise timetable; as we do not focus on the investment expansion path over time. Therefore, the
main concern regarding the investment modeling is to capture the effects of the shocks  on the
allocation of current investment expenditure across sectors and regions.
Labor Market and Regional Migration
In this module, the population in each region is defined exogenously through the interaction of
demographic and interregional migration variables, and there is also a connection between regional
population and labor supply. Given the specification of the labor market, labor supply can be
determined by interregional wage differentials or by regional unemployment rates, along with
demographic variables, often defined exogenously. In sum, both labor supply and wage differentials
may determine unemployment rates or, alternatively, labor supply and unemployment rates will
determine wage differentials.6
Public finance module
The public finance module incorporates equations determining the gross regional product for each
region, through the decomposition and modeling of its components, on both the expenditure and
income sides. The budget constraints of the regional and federal governments also are defined, as
well as the aggregate household consumption functions in each region (disaggregated by the main
sources of income and by the respective tax duties).
Figure 2 describes the main characteristics of the government’s budget and the fiscal linkages
between the central and regional governments modeled in the B-MARIA-RS model in accordance
with the Brazilian federalism. The income taxes and the contributions (other indirect taxes) are the
most important source of revenue for the central government of Brazil while the indirect commodity
tax (an excise tax collected on goods and services transactions by the origin principle) is the main
source of revenue for the regional governments. The Brazilian constitutional rules imposes a hard
vertical linkage between governments since 21.5% of the income and commodity taxes collected by
the central government should be transferred to the regional governments.
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The B-MARIA-RS model can be used for short-run and long-run comparative static simulations.
The basic distinction between these two types of closure lies in the treatment given to the
microeconomic approach to capital stock adjustment. Capital stocks are held fixed in the short run,
whereas in the long run, policy changes may affect capital stocks in each region.
5 In the short-run
closure, in addition to the hypothesis of interindustry and interregional capital immobility, the
regional population and labor supply are fixed, the regional wage differentials are constant and the
national real wage is fixed. Regional employment is driven by the assumptions on wage rates,
which indirectly determine regional unemployment rates. On the demand side, investment
expenditures are exogenous – firms cannot reassess investment decisions in the short run.
Household consumption follows household disposable income, and government consumption, at
both regional and federal levels, is fixed (alternatively, government deficit can be set exogenously,
allowing government expenditures to change). Finally, the technology variables are exogenous,
given that the model does not present any endogenous growth theory.
In the long-run closure, capital and labor are mobile across sectors and regions. The major
differences from the short-run closure lie in the configuration of the labor market and capital
accumulation. In the former case, aggregate employment is determined by population growth, labor
force participation rates, and the natural rate of unemployment. The distribution of labor force
across regions and sectors is totally determined endogenously. Labor is attracted to more
competitive sectors in more favored geographical areas. Likewise, capital is directed towards more
attractive sectors. This movement keeps the rates of return at their initial levels.
3. Modeling strategy
The simulation is implemented assuming that regional governments play one-shot non- cooperative
game where percentage changes in indirect tax rates on manufacturing goods are used as strategies
to influence allocations of the productive factors (long run closure), capital and labor, in order to
increase the welfare of each regional representative household. We assume percentage changes in
indirect tax rates are limited in range due to the electoral implications in the political cycle and
institutional issues associated with the fiscal federal system
6. On the one hand, if the tax rate falls
below a certain threshold the welfare losses caused by reductions in public good provision can
damage the self interest of the government’s authorities since the median voter can remove them in
the next election. On the other hand, this can also occur if the tax rate increase above this threshold
since the representative household welfare will be worse off due to the increases in the goods
prices. Thus, we define ad hoc that the range of tax rates changes is 10%, that is, the strategies set
of the regional governments is composed by percentage changes in the indirect tax rates limited to
the space [-0.10, +0.10]
7.
Looking at the Figure 2, this tax competition game implies in changes at the tax revenue collected
by the regional governments and a fiscal solvency rule should be defined. Then, we assume the
regional governments engage in a non cooperative game concerned with the welfare of the regional
representative household and the regional public goods provision (regional government
consumption) will be adjusted to maintain the fiscal solvency. This requires building a welfare
measure that accounts for the changes in the private and public good consumption in order to
evaluate the effects of the tax competition policy. To do so, the game’s payoffs is calculated by a
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welfare measure that combines additively the Hicksian measure of relative equivalent variation with
the percentage changes in the provision of regional public goods post-simulation the tax
competition policy. The first one is defined as the percentage change of the benchmark income the
representative household would need in order to get a post-simulation utility under benchmark
prices (Bröcker, 1998). Formally, for linear utility functions, the welfare measure used to compute
the payoffs of the tax competition game it can be written as
8:
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public good consumption and θU and θG are the private and public goods shares of the
representative household consumption. Note that, when the tax competition policy implies
reductions in indirect tax rates, the benefits associated with the reduction in basic prices is balanced
by the “social” cost of reduction in public good provision because there is less tax revenue to
guarantee the fiscal solvency. In other words, due the fiscal solvency rule, the provision of public
goods will be as small as the tax collection. Then, W
r > 0 if the private consumption gains
overcome the public consumption losses.
Now, following Mendoza and Tesar (2003), we can define that the Nash equilibrium of the regional
tax competition game is computed as a pair of percentage changes in indirect tax rates (τ
RS, τ
RB) and



















r (r = RS, RB) ∈ [-0.10, +0,10];
iv) the fiscal solvency rules are satisfied for the regional and federal governments.
Finally, the simulation also is carried on the hypothesis of exogenous fiscal policy by the federal
government. That is, the federal government doesn’t have a reaction function in the context of the
regional tax competition game, but the vertical linkages still remain because of the constitutional
rules. This is an important issue in the Brazilian federalism and alternative closures for the fiscal
policy of the federal government can be explored in the future research.
4. Results
A four-step Euler procedure is adopted in the solution the model and the results are reported as
percentage changes from the benchmark database. Table 1 presents the payoffs matrix for the
regional tax competition game simulated with the B-MARIA-RS model. The results are presented
by each 2% changes in the strategies set to evaluate potential non linearities of the payoffs and the
slope of the reaction function. The welfare measure shows that the regional representative
households are better off when both governments play reductions in the tax rate of the
manufacturing goods and are worse off otherwise. The optimal strategies are on the left-right
diagonal of the payoffs matrix and the reaction function has a positive slope, that is, the regional
governments tend to adopt the same policy choice in such tax competition game. Therefore, the
Nash equilibrium is on the left-left corner of the payoffs matrix and corresponds to the usual race-
to-the-bottom outcome as advocated by the benevolent-base theories. But the Nash equilibrium is
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welfare-improving like the findings of Mendoza e Tesar (2003). As we will see below, the welfare
gains are probably explained by the vertical fiscal linkages because the regional tax competition
raises the national tax base and, therefore, the federal transfers to the regional governments
compensating own tax revenue reductions.
It is worth to note an interesting result in the payoffs matrix, that is, the majority of the payoffs are
positive when the Rio Grande do Sul’s government increases the indirect tax rate and the Rest of
Brazil’s reduce it. The interregional feedback effects and the size asymmetries between the regional
economies explain much of this outcome. The final result of the substitution effects associated with
the relative prices changes is a composite price of the private goods lower than the benchmark
composite prices for both regions. For the Rio Grande do Sul’s representative household, the gains
of private consumption due to the interregional substitution effect overcome the losses caused by
the increase in the local basic prices. This occurs because there is a high integration between these
economies. For the Rest of Brazil, the composite price of the goods is lower than the benchmark
due to reduction in local prices. The primary factor income rises due the productive re-location
effects caused by the mobility of the factors. Also, the Rest of Brazil economy is benefited by the
international substitution effects and, since it represents about 92% of the Brazilian economy, its
growth has a significant spillover effect on the Rio Grande do Sul.
Table 2 presents the main macroeconomic effects at the Nash equilibrium. The regional tax
competition produces a general reduction in the price indexes and the majority of the aggregated
demand components have a real positive variation. Both regional economies become more efficient
and the output expansion requires a larger demand of primary factors (capital and labor), increasing
their earnings. The level of integration between the regional economies raises and there is also a
positive effect on the international trade balance because of the substitution effect of imported
goods. All the feedback effects of regional tax competition cause an expansion in output and
employment for the regions and the whole country. The negative effect in the Rest of Brazil’s
employment just reveals an adjustment in the regional labor market due to the migration effects.
Only the regional government consumption presents a real reduction because of the fiscal solvency
rule. As showed in Table 3, the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium implies a substantial negative
variation in indirect commodity tax revenues of the regional governments. The budget balance is
achieved by reductions in the regional public good provisions (regional government consumption).
But, since the national tax base rises due to the positive feedback effects of regional tax
competition, there is a positive effect on the indirect commodity taxes and the income tax collected
by the federal government. This effect benefits the regional government budgets through the
vertical linkages associated with the constitutional rules and helps to alleviate the reduction
pressures on the regional government’s revenue and on the regional public goods provision.
Otherwise, would be needed a bigger reduction of expenditure side to achieve the regional fiscal
solvency. Therefore, the hard vertical linkages contributes to alleviate the adjustment pressures on
the regional public goods provision when regional tax competition is active and such specificity of


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 2. Macro-regional effects at the Nash equilibrium (%)
Variables Rio Grande do Sul Rest of Brazil Brazil
GDP components
Real household consumption 1.405 1.071 1.094
Real aggregate investment 1.720 1.325 1.350
Real aggregate regional government demand -2.390 -2.712 -2.206
Real aggregate federal government demand - - -
Interregional export volume 1.273 1.567 -
International export volume 2.063 1.691 1.727
Interregional import volume 1.567 1.273 -
International  import volume 0.865 0.611 0.625
Prices
Consumer price index -0.516 -0.390 -0.399
Investment price index -0.502 -0.366 -0.375
Regional government price index 0.578 0.492 0.497
Federal government price index 0.578 0.492 0.496
Interregional export price index -0.282 -0.171 -
International export price index -1.198 -0.957 -0.980
Interregional import price index -0.171 -0.282 -
International import price index - - -
GDP deflator (expenditure side) -0.505 -0.321 -0.335
Primary factors
Aggregate payments to capital 1.131 0.929 0.944
Aggregate payments to labor 1.008 0.773 0.791
Aggregate capital stock 1.642 1.305 1.329
Welfare indicators
REV 4.446 4.744 4.720
Real GDP 0.998 0.731 0.751
Employment 0.218 -0.015 0.002
Source: calculated by the authors.12
Table 3. Public finances effects at the Nash equilibrium by level of government (%)
Governments
Variables
Rio Grande do Sul Rest of Brazil Federal
Government’s revenue -2.010 -2.239 -0.129
Tax revenue -2.442 -2.390 0.299
   Direct taxes -0.090 -0.084 0.237
Income taxes - - 0.352
Other direct taxes -0.090 -0.084 -0.083
   Indirect taxes -7.882 -5.975 0.752
Tariff revenue - - 0.084
Commodity taxes -9.653 -7.091 4.102
Payroll taxes 0.702 0.555 -0.083
Property taxes -0.090 -0.084 -
Land taxes - - -
Other indirect taxes -0.090 -0.084 -0.083
   Interests received -0.090 -0.084 -0.083
   Federal transfers 22.101 11.130 -
   Other revenues -0.090 -0.084 -0.083
Discrepancy -2.404 -2.726 -
Public deficit - - -
Government’s expenditure -2.010 -2.239 -0.129
Expenditures with goods and services -2.051 -2.322 0.041
   Government consumption -2.404 -2.726 -
   Government investment 0.632 0.462 0.545
Personal benefit payments -0.759 -0.905 -0.887
Subsidies -7.087 -4.835 -5.020
Interest payments -0.090 -0.084 -0.083
Federal transfers to regions - - 11.903
Other outlays -2.010 -2.239 -0.129
Source: calculated by the authors.
56. Final remarks
In an empirical perspective, this paper provided important insights for the debate on
interjurisdictional tax competition. In accordance with Mendoza and Tesar (2003), the experimental
exercise implemented through the B-MARIA-RS model showed the one-shot tax competition game
between regional governments can imply a race-to-the-bottom Nash equilibrium on tax rates, but
welfare improving. However, while the regional governments indirect tax revenues fall markedly
due to the reduction in tax rate at the Nash equilibrium, the federal government revenue is benefited
by the growth in national tax base of the direct and indirect taxes. In special case of the Brazilian
federalism, the welfare gains of the regional tax competition can be very high since the hard vertical
linkages imposed by the constitutional rules allow alleviating the reduction pressures on the
regional provision of public goods. In addition, it can be seen that price effects are very important,
leading to welfare gains. Focusing only of fiscal issues only lead to a limited and misleading picture
of tax competition. The CGE approach allows shifting the focus of the political discourse from
public finances to actual household welfare.
These findings suggest that the actual effects of the interjurisdictional tax competition depend on
the empirical structure of the economic system in analysis, such as the complementary or
competitive relationships between the regional economies and the fiscal environment. The welfare
improving outcome founded in this paper probably is associated with the methodological solution13
employed here, that is, the CGE modeling. Differently of the partial analysis used in many
theoretical issues on tax competition, the CGE approach allows to overcome the hypothesis that
governments do not evaluate the fiscal externalities into the payoff function. Such hypothesis is
very appropriated in a partial context but not in a general equilibrium analysis because all feedback
effects are computed in the equilibrium solution. In other words, the payoffs calculated by the CGE
model take into account the bi-directional impact of the tax policy changes executed by each
regional government. More precisely, the Nash equilibrium is an allocation Pareto optimum.
The analysis of the interjurisdictional tax competition in the context of the Brazilian federal system
showed that the fiscal rules matter for the outcome. It was observed that the hard vertical linkage
between the governments is an important aspect of the welfare improving equilibrium. While this
may be specific to the Brazilian federalism system, it can provide much needed input for fiscal
reforms discussions across the region. Also, the simulation was implemented on the hypothesis that
fiscal policy of the federal government is exogenous, implying the federal government is not an
active player in the tax competition game. But in the last decade, the Brazilian federal government
has been making several changes in its fiscal policy in order to raise its role in the economy after
the 1988 Constitutional reform promoted a decentralization process. The federal government
promoted reductions in the indirect and direct tax rates, compensated by increases in the social
contributions. In addition, the rigidity of the governmental expenditure, also implemented by the
1998 Constitutional reform, and the adoption of a Fiscal Responsibility Law in order to maintain the
fiscal solvency have imposed hard limits to adjustments in the public expenditures. Then,
evaluating the welfare sensitivity of interjurisdictional tax competition by different hypothesis on
the behavior of the federal government as an active player and on the rigidity in promote
expenditure adjustments by the regional governments seems a prominent issue to be explored in the
future research.
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Appendix
The notational convention uses uppercase letters to represent the levels of the variables and
lowercase for their percentage-change representation. Superscripts (u), u = 0, 1j, 2j, 3, 4, 5, 6, refer,
respectively, to output (0) and to the six different regional-specific users of the products identified
in the model: producers in sector j (1j), investors in sector j (2j), households (3), purchasers of
exports  (4), regional governments (5) and the Federal government (6); the second superscript
identifies the domestic region where the user is located. Inputs are identified by two subscripts: the
first takes the values 1, ..., g, for commodities, g + 1, for primary factors, and g + 2, for “other
costs” (basically, taxes and subsidies on production); the second subscript identifies the source of
the input, being it from domestic region b (1b) or imported (2), or coming from labor (1), capital (2)
or land (3). The symbol (•) is employed to indicate a sum over an index.
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(A2) Substitution between domestic and imported products
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(A3) Substitution between labor, capital and land
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(A4) Intermediate and investment demands for composites commodities and primary factors
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(A5) Household demands for composite commodities16
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(A6) Composition of output by industries
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(A7) Indirect tax rates
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(A8) Purchasers’ prices related to basic prices, margins (transportation costs) and taxes
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(A9) Foreign demands (exports) for domestic goods
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(A10) Regional governments demands
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(A13) Demand equals supply for regional domestic commodities
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(A14) Regional industry revenue equals industry costs
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(A15) Basic price of imported commodities
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(A16) Cost of constructing units of capital for regional industries
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(A18) Capital stock in period T+1 – comparative statics
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(A20) Relation between capital growth and rates of return
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Other definitions in the CGE core include: revenue from indirect taxes, import volume of
commodities, components of regional/national GDP, regional/national price indices, wage settings,
definitions of factor prices, and employment aggregates.18
Variables
Variable Index ranges Description






(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1,…,h;
if (u) = (1j)  then i = 1,…,g + 2;
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1,…,g;
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q; and i = 1,…,g
and






(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1,…,h;
if (u) = (1j)  then i = 1,…,g + 2;
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1,…,g;
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q; and i = 1,…,g
and
s = 1, 2, 3 for i = g+1
r = 1,…,R






(u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and
 j = 1, …,h.
if (u) = (1j) then i = 1, …,g + 1;
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1, …,g
r = 1,…,R
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j = 1, …,h and s = 1, 2, 3
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i = 1,...,g, (u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2
and j = 1,..., h
r = 1,…,R
Technical change related to the use of good i by user (u) in
region r
r C Total expenditure by regional household in region r
r Q Number of households
r u z
) ( (u) = (kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …,h
r = 1,…,R
Activity levels: current production and investment by





i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …,q
r = 1,…,R






i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …,q
r = 1,…,R






m, i = 1,…,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2  and j = 1, …,h
r = 1,…,R
Demand for commodity (m1) to be used as a margin to





m, i = 1,…,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2  and j = 1, …,h
r = 1,…,R
Technical change related to the demand for commodity (m1)
to be used as a margin to facilitate the flow of (is) to (u) in
region r19





i = 1,…,g;  j = 1,…,h
r = 1,...,R





i = 1,…,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q
r = 1,...,R
Basic price of good i in region r from source s
) (
)) 2 ( (
w
i p i = 1,…,g USD c.i.f. price of imported commodity i
) 0 (
)) 2 ( (i t i = 1,…,g Power of the tariff on imports of i
) ) ( , , , ( r u s i t τ i = 1,…,g;τ = 1,…,t;
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6)
and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1,…,h
r = 1,...,R








Regional-industry-specific capital shift terms
r
k f ) (
r = 1,...,R Capital shift term in region r
) 1 (
) 1 (
) 2 , 1 (
r j
g x +
j = 1,…, h
r = 1,...,R
Capital stock in industry j in region r at the end of the year,





j = 1,…, h
r = 1,...,R
Cost of constructing a unit of capital for industry j in region r
) (τ f τ = 1,…,t Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes in the
power of tax τ
) ( i f τ τ = 1,…,t;
i = 1, …,g
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes in the




i f τ τ = 1,…,t;
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1, …, h
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes in the




) (τ τ = 1,…,t;
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1, …, h
r = 1,…,R
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes in the





i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q
r = 1,…,R
Commodity and source-specific shift term for regional
government expenditures in region r
r f
) 5 ( r = 1,…,R Shift term for regional government expenditures in region r





i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q
r = 1,…,R
Commodity and source-specific shift term for Federal
government expenditures in region r
r f
) 6 ( r = 1,…,R Shift term for Federal government expenditures in region r
) 6 ( f Shift term for Federal government expenditures
ω Overall rate of return on capital (short-run)
r
j r ) (
j = 1,...,h
r = 1,…,R
Regional-industry-specific rate of return20





) ( σ Parameter: elasticity of substitution between alternative sources of commodity or factor i
for user (u) in region r





) , 1 ( + α Parameter: returns to scale to individual primary factors in industry j in region r
r
i) ( β Parameter: marginal budget shares in linear expenditure system for commodity i in region r
r
i) ( γ Parameter: subsistence parameter in linear expenditure system for commodity i in region r
r
j) ( ε Parameter: sensitivity of capital growth to rates of return of industry j in region r
r




) ( θ Parameter: scale economies to transportation of commodity (i) produced in region r shipped to user




) ( • µ Parameter: returns to scale to primary factors (i = g+1 and u = 1j); otherwise,  1
) (
) ( = •
r u
i µ
) ), ( , , ( r u s i B Input-output flow: basic value of (is) used by (u) in region r
) ), ( , , , ( r u s i m M Input-output flow: basic value of domestic good m used as a margin to facilitate the flow of (is) to
(u) in region r
) ), ( , , , ( r u s i T τ Input-output flow: collection of tax τ  on the sale of (is) to (u) in region r
) ), ( , , ( r u s i V Input-output flow: purchasers’ value of good or factor i from source s used by user (u) in region r
) , , ( r j i Y Input-output flow: basic value of output of domestic good i by industry j from region r
r
j Q ) (
Coefficient: ratio, gross to net rate of return
G Set: {1,2, …, g}, g is the number of composite goods
G* Set: {1,2, …, g+1}, g+1 is the number of composite goods and primary factors
H Set: {1,2, …, h}, h is the number of industries
U Set: {(3), (4), (5), (6), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h}
U* Set: {(3), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h}
S Set: {1, 2, …, r+1}, r+1 is the number of regions (including foreign)
S* Set: {1, 2, …,r}, r is the number of domestic regions
T Set: {1, …, t}, t is the number of indirect taxes